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Bussart: Conflict of Laws - Comity - Extraterritorial Enforcement of State

CASE NOTES
CONFLICT

OF LAWS-Comity-Extraterritorial Enforcement of State Tax
Claims. Nelson v. Minnesota Income Tax Div., 429 P. 324 (Wyo.
1967).

The State of Minnesota, by its Attorney General,' sued
in the district court of Fremont County, Wyoming for collection of a state income tax assessed against the defendant
Nelson, while he resided in Minnesota. Nelson was a resident
of Wyoming at the time this suit was instituted. Holding
that the State of Wyoming should enforce the tax laws of
sister states on principles of comity,' the judge of the district
court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment,
and judgment was thereby entered against defendant in the
sum of $581.87 plus costs. The judgment included a penalty
for failure to file a tax return, in addition to the amount of
the assessed tax.' The defendant appealed, contending that
taxation is a legislative function, and therefore an improper
subject for comity to be extended by the courts. In remanding the case with instructions to modify, the Wyoming
Supreme Court held that Wyoming courts would, on principles of comity, enforce the tax laws of a sister state by entertaining suit for taxes due, but that the penalty provisions of
the Minnesota tax law could not be enforced.
Until 1946,' there had been almost universal application
by the American states of the rule enunciated by Lord Mansfield in 1775' that "no country ever takes notice of the revenue
laws of another. "' This 'decision stemmed from a dicta in
an earlier case where Lord Hardwicke had refused to recognize the validity of a Portuguese revenue measure.' The
Portuguese statute outlawed export of gold from Portugal.
A contract was made for shipment of gold from Portugal to
England in violation of the statute. In a suit to require
1.

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§

290.48(1)

(1962).

2. "The principle in accordance with which the courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not
as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect." H. BLACK,
LAW DICTIONARY 334 (4th ed. 1951).
3.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.53(3) (1962) provides for assessment of a penalty
up to an amount equalling 50% of the face amount of the assessed liability.

4.

State ex rel. Oklahoma State Tax Comm'n. v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App 1115,
193 S.W.2d 919 (1946).

5.

Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K. B. 1775).

6. Id. at 1121.
7. Boucher v. Lawson, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734).
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performance of the contract, the contract's validity was
upheld, and the statute ignored. From these rudiments
developed a well-settled rule of law in England that foreign
revenue laws were unenforceable.
The early American courts immediately followed suit
and applied the rule of the mother country in analogous
cases.' Once the rule had become entrenched in this country
there began an expansion of its application to diverse fact
situations. Maryland v. Turner9 was the first in a line of
significant New York cases1" to establish the rule that tax
claims of sister states would not be enforced. In that case,
the State of Maryland brought an action in New York for
collection of a personal property tax. The New York court
held that the claim was penal in nature, and that it was not
"'bound by any rule of comity to enforce the tax laws of
Maryland.""1 Subsequently, in Colorado v. Harbeck,"2 the
leading New York case, the court disallowed a suit on a transfer tax claim against a former resident's estate. Although
the decision was based on a constitutional issue, the court
gained wide notice for its dictum that one state will not
enforce the revenue laws of another."s A substantial line of
precedent evolved from these two cases in New York expounding the logic underlying non-enforcement of sister-state
tax claims. 4 Thereafter, the rule enjoyed extensive acceptance throughout the state jurisdictions.1 5 That extraterritorial tax claims were unenforceable became a universally
accepted rule of
law.
The issue was first adjudicated by a federal court in
8. Ludlow v. Van Rensselar, 1 Johns. 92 (N.Y. 1806); Henry v. Sargent, 13
N.H. 321 (1848).
9. 75 Misc. 9, 132 N.Y.S. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1911), noted 12 COLUM. L. REv. 60
(1912).
10. City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401, 184 N.E.2d 167, cert. denied,
371 U.S. 934 (1962); Wayne County v. American Steel Export Co., 277
App. Div. 585, 101 N.Y.S.2d 522, (1950); In re Buckley's Estate, 31 Misc.2d
551, 220 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sur. Ct. 1961); In re Bliss' Estate, 121 Misc. 773,
202 N.Y.S. 185 (Sur. Ct. 1923). See also cases cited in note 8 supra.
11. Maryland v. Turner, supra note 9, at 175.
12. 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921). The statement was a dictum, but the
case seems to be the one cited most often for the rule.
13. Id. at 85, 133 N.E. at 360.
14. See cases cited note 10 eupra.
15. Cf. Annot., 165 A.L.R. 796 (1946). See generally Leflar, Extrastate Enforeement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1932);
Ruby & Pyle, ExtrateritorialEnforcement of Tax Claims, 16 HASTINGS
L. J. 101 (1964); Extrastate Collection of Taxes, 33 VA. L. REv. 179 (1947).
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1929.1" The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit denied enforcement of a tax claim prosecuted in New
York by the Treasurer of Grant County, Indiana. Judge
Learned Hand, in a concurring opinion," rationalized the
rule of non-enforcement on the premise that to enforce another
state's tax laws, a forum state would initially have to inquire
if such laws were contrary to its public policy. Such determination, it was argued, would require a scrutiny of the taxing
state's relations with its citizens, and might result in commission of the forum "to a position which would seriously
embarrass its neighbor."8 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on other
grounds, expressly leaving unanswered the question of extrastate enforcement.1 9 However, in later cases, dicta of the
Court have indicated a favorable attitude toward enforcement
of tax liabilities arising in sister states.2"
An important modification of the rule resulted with the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Milwaukee County
v. M. E. White Co.; 2 the Court held that under the full faith
and credit clause of the federal constitution, 2 where a tax
claim has been reduced to judgment, a sister state must
allow action on the judgment in its courts. The original claim
in that case was for income tax and the Court reasoned that
since the liability of the taxpayer was quasi-contractual in
nature, no policy of the forum state could have sufficient
weight to counteract the interests of the taxing state and the
policy of the full faith and credit clause of the constitution.
However, the Court once again declined to decide "whether
one state must enforce the revenue laws of another."" There
the issue presently rests.
16. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929), aff'd on other grounds, 281
U.S. 18 (1930), noted 5 IND. L. J. 625, 5 WIsc. L. Ruv. 494.
17. Id. at 603.
18. Id. at 604.
19. Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U.S. 18 (1930).
20. "With respect to the character of the claim now urged, we are not advised
that Missouri would close its courts to a civil action brought by Massachusetts to recover the tax alleged to be due from the trustees." Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 20 (1939). "Still the obligation to pay
taxes is not penal. It is a statutory liability, quasi-contractual in nature,
enforcible, if there is no exclusive statutory remedy, in the civil courts by
the common law action of debt or indebitatus assumpsit." Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 271 (1935).
21. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
23. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., supra note 21, at 275. It has been
argued that since the forum must accord full faith and credit to a judgment under the statute of a sister state, the forum must also necessarily
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As previously stated, until 1946 the uncontroverted
weight of authority was, without exception, that such extraterritorial claims as herein involved were unenforceable.
In that year, the Supreme Court of Missouri rendered a
decision in the case of State ex rel. Oklahoma v. Rodgers "
holding for the first time that a state court would extend
comity to another state in order to enforce a tax claim. The
Missouri court reasoned that the doctrine promulgated by
Mansfield and Hardwicke had been applied to situations
beyond the scope of the probable anticipation of those eminent
jurists. The court distinguished those cases on the grounds
that they involved no attempt to collect a tax, but commercial
considerations, by which forum courts refused to enforce
foreign revenue laws as a means of invalidating contracts
which were -perfectly legal in the forum. The court reasoned
that as a result of the failure to recognize this distinction,
courts had applied the rule blindly without reference to the
wisdom of its results.
Rodgers was heavily relied upon by the Wyoming
Supreme Court in the principal case. After reviewing
Rodgers, Mr. Justice McIntyre paraphrased the philosophy
of the Missouri court "that a taxpayer who enjoys the protection of government should bear his share of the expense
of maintaining the government, and should not be permitted
to escape his obligation by crossing state lines."" Said the
Wyoming court in Nelson, "There is no longer any valid
justification for not permitting a suit in one state for a tax
lawfully levied by another."2 6
An analysis of Nelson v. Minnesota Income Tax Division
demonstrates the lack of any sound basis for refusing to
extend comity. As the court in the Rodgers case pointed out,
the earliest English and American cases involved fact situaaccord full faith and credit to the statute of the sister state. See 49 HAav.
L. REV. 490 (1936). In addition a 1948 revision of the statute which implements the full faith and credit clause may have some impact in dictating
greater full faith and credit to causes of action. 1 Stat. 722 (1790) was
amended by 62 Stat. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964) to specify that
the public acts of sister states must be given the same faith and credit
in every state as is accorded to judgments of sister states.
24. 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946). An earlier case allowing enforcement did not clearly hold that state tax claims could be extraterritorially enforced on the basis of comity. J. A. Holhauser Co. v. Gold Hill Copper
Co., 138 N.C. 248, 50 S.E. 650 (1905).
25. Nelson v. Minnesota Income Tax Div., 429 P.2d 324, 325 (Wyo. 1967).
26. Id. at 325.
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tions totally dissimilar to the fact situation of the principal
case. Such decisions as were therein rendered provided the
courts with an indirect means of giving effect to a contract
and preserving the commercial convenience of the forum
nation. In addition, another significant ramification existed:
During the perio'd in which the cases recognized as giving
birth to the doctrine were decided, England was at war with
the nations whose revenue laws were involved. These bases
for the formation of the rule are obviously inapplicable in
the present context, 7 yet courts have applied the ancient
axiom of non-enforcement without giving due consideration
to the significance of such circumstances at that time and to
their manifest irrelevancy at present.
The other major premise upon which refusal to extend
comity has consistently been based, is the erroneous categorization by the courts of revenue laws as penal. Support for
this contention has by analogy been drawn to the field of
criminal law.2 8 It has been the position of many courts that
both criminal and revenue laws serve primarily governmental
purposes in assessing liability, and therein lies their penal
nature. In truth, however, the only parallel philosophy which
an analysis of the two bo'dies of law reveals is the fact that
each is in the nature of governmental regulation of civic
duties. 9 Justice Cardozo has elucidated the test of a law's
penal nature. To be penal within the rules of international
law, a statute must have as its purpose, "not reparation to one
aggrieved, but vindication of the public justice." 30 In that
context, a revenue law, totally lacking any vindictive purpose
as the basis of its creation, can hardly be viewed as penal. In
Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.,"' discussed supra, the
Supreme Court said "still the obligation to pay taxes is not
32
penal. It is a statutory liability quasi-contractual in nature."
A revenue law in no way punishes: it rather defines the extent
of a citizen's obligation to the government, in return for
which the citizen is afforded protection of his rights.
27. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n. v. Rodgers, supra note 24.
28. See note 15 supra, Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198
(1918).
29. Id.
80. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 28.
31. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
32. Id. at 271.
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Another reason for the decisions in the English cases
was the 'desire by the courts of the forum to maintain and
perpetuate the sovereign status of a nation and its laws. This
motive no longer has any pertinence in light of the limited
extent to which state sovereignty exists in the context of
American federalism, especially under the mandates of the
full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution.3
There also exists a basic weakness in Judge Hand's
contention that scrutiny by one state of another state's relations with its citizens might lead to the forum placing its sister
state in an embarrassing position; the sister state in bringing
the action has indicated a willingness to risk the possibility
of embarrassment to collect tax.
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed that portion of
the district court judgment awarding the State of Minnesota
a penalty for failure to file a tax return."4 The relevant provision of the Minnesota revenue law clearly designates that
the amount in question is to be assessed as a penalty for
failure to file a tax return. There is voluminous precedent
for a refusal to enforce the penalty provisions of another
state's laws. 5 Futhermore, it has been the perpetual philosophy of retributive justice that one state should not undertake to vindicate violations of the laws of another state."
Yet it should be noted that in the present case, the penalty
provision, if enforced, would have accomplished nothing more
than to compensate the State of Minnesota for the costs
incurred in locating the whereabouts of the defendant and
prosecuting the suit for collection of the tax. Considering
the nature of the defendant's initial liability for the tax,
that being in the nature of a debt, 7 and the expenses and
inconvenience incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the
defendant's failure to satisfy the debt, it is conceivable that
the judgment served not as a penalty, but as a component
of the debt itself. Had the provision been framed in the
33. Id. at 276: "The very purpose of the full faith and credit clause was ...
to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties,
each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial
proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single
nation....."
34. Nelson v. Minnesota Income Tax Div., 8upra note 25, at 825.
35. See authorities cited notes 15, 28 supra.
36. Id.
37. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., supra note 20.
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context of an interest assessment, the court's refusal to
enforce it would be somewhat more vulnerable to criticism.
In light of the sum being specifically designated as a penalty
in the statute, however, there is uncontroverted authority for
the court's decision.
Complexities of modern civilization have resulted in the
creation of a greater need among the states to raise revenue
to better meet the needs of their citizens. Modern mobility
enables those who would cast off their legal duties to evade
the law, conveniently aided in their flight by rules created
in times when the implication of their present strict applications could hardly have been envisaged. The philosophies
of the law in a nation such as ours have nullified the underlying foundations of many older rules. More important in
contemporary America than the so-called sovereign character
of state governments is the realization by state courts that
evasion of valid tax laws with impunity by such people as
the defendant in the present case causes a substantial increase
in the burden of the conscientious citizen. In the words of
Justice Cardozo, the courts "are not free to refuse to enforce
a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the
individual notion of expediency or fairness." They should
not "close their doors, unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal."

8

The refusal of the Wyoming Supreme Court to perpetuate the doctrine of non-enforcement of a sister state's tax
claim is wholly commendable. Yet, despite the unimpeachable
logic underlying such a decision as was here rendered, Wyoming is only the fifth jurisdiction to adopt the rule."9 That
extraterritorial tax claims will not be enforced is yet the
view of an overwhelming majority of state jurisdictions.
FORD T. BUSSART
38. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 28.
39. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n. v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 282 S.W.2d
150 (1955), noted in 9 VAND. L. REv. 389 (1956); Ohio ex rel. Duffy v.
Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 234 S.W.2d 722 (1950), noted in 39 Ky. L. J. 472
(1951); City of Detroit v. Gould, 12 Ii1. 2d 297, 146 N.E.2d 61 (1957),
noted in CHI.-KENT L. REV. 71 (1959), 7 DE PAUL L. REv. 243 (1958);
California ex rel. Houser v. St. Louis Trust Co., 260 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1953), approving its earlier decision in Rodgers, but distinguishing the
case on its facts.
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